The truth about solar: common claims about PV examined (2016)
Does solar use too much land, never repay its energy, fail when clouds pass, or leave toxic waste? Common PV claims checked against 2016 evidence, with a later update.
In 2012 factory inspectors reported average module defect rates of 8.8%. Why quality slipped, what IEC 61215 and 61730 test, and how PID and snail trails show up.
In November 2012 Renewable Energy World asked whether two years of oversupply and collapsing prices had led to a rise in poorly made solar panels. The executives it interviewed, from inspection, testing, materials and finance companies, said yes. Their evidence, and the reasons behind it, are worth revisiting, because they explain why module quality assurance became a discipline of its own.
The most widely quoted figure came from SolarBuyer, a Boston-based firm that sent inspectors with manufacturing experience into factories on behalf of developers and investors. Its managing director said inspections of modules leaving production lines found an average defect rate of 8.8%, with individual factories ranging from 5.5% to 22%.
The problems described fell into two groups:
PV Evolution Labs, an independent reliability-testing laboratory, reported degradation of the materials holding cells together, yellowing of backsheets and encapsulants, and junction boxes detaching because too little adhesive had been used, which could create a fire risk. Its chief executive linked this directly to financial stress: a company expecting to run out of cash within months will prioritise cash flow over quality. A materials supplier said it had found inferior components in competitors’ panels, and had met a manufacturer offering modules in three quality grades.
The interviewees stressed that the issue was not confined to Chinese manufacturers; European and American companies, including well-known brands, were also affected. None of them named specific producers.
The background was the oversupply described in our restored analysis of PV module consolidation in 2013–2014. GTM Research estimated in October 2012 that module gross margins had fallen from more than 30% in late 2010 to low single digits by mid-2012. It also observed that buyers had begun treating modules as commodities, assuming that quality did not differ much between producers. When buyers choose on price alone and sellers are losing money on every watt, the cheapest place to save a few cents is in materials and process control, and the results may not appear until years later in the field.
A defect found in a factory inspection is not the same as a field failure. Inspectors typically look for visible faults (chipped cells, misaligned strings, bubbles in the laminate, poor framing), check electrical performance with a flash test, and may use electroluminescence (EL) imaging, which makes cracks and inactive cell areas visible. Some defects are cosmetic, some reduce power slightly, and some are latent faults that worsen with heat and humidity. An 8.8% defect rate therefore did not mean that one module in eleven would fail, but it did indicate weak process control, and weak control raises the risk of the latent faults that matter most.
Modules sold into most markets in 2012 were expected to carry two certifications:
The best-known IEC 61215 stress tests, as described by NREL and in the related ASTM E1171 methods, include:
| Test | Typical condition | What it reveals |
|---|---|---|
| Thermal cycling | 200 cycles between low and high temperature, with current applied | Fatigue in solder bonds and interconnections |
| Damp heat | 1,000 hours at 85 °C and 85% relative humidity | Moisture ingress, corrosion, delamination |
| Humidity freeze | 10 cycles combining humidity and sub-zero temperatures | Adhesion failures and moisture-related cracking |
| UV preconditioning | Defined UV dose before other tests | Early discolouration of polymers |
These tests have two important limits. They are applied to a small set of samples to approve a design, so they say nothing about whether every later production batch uses the same materials and care. And, as ASTM itself notes, they are too short to determine a module’s service life. A factory that substitutes a cheaper backsheet after certification can still sell a “certified” product. This is why independent factory audits, bill-of-materials controls and pre-shipment inspection became standard for large buyers.
The IEA PVPS Task 13 Review of Failures of Photovoltaic Modules (2014) catalogued the field problems that inspectors and owners were reporting at the time. Several deserve a short explanation.
Potential induced degradation (PID). In a long string of modules, cells at one end can sit at several hundred volts relative to the earthed frame. Under heat and humidity, that voltage can drive ions through the glass and encapsulant towards the cells, causing significant power loss. Susceptibility depends heavily on materials, so PID became a way to distinguish careful manufacturers from careless ones.
Snail trails. Dark, branching lines that appear on cells after months outdoors, often following invisible micro-cracks. They are a discolouration of the silver contact paste, associated with moisture and encapsulant chemistry. Their visual effect is striking; the IEA review noted that their exact origin and effect on power were still not fully understood in 2014, but they are a useful indicator that a cell is cracked.
Cell cracks. Caused by rough handling, transport, installation or snow and wind loads. Small cracks may cost little power at first but can grow with thermal cycling, isolating parts of a cell.
Encapsulant discolouration and backsheet failure. Yellowing or browning of the EVA encapsulant reduces light reaching the cells. Cracking or delamination of the backsheet exposes the module to moisture and creates safety risks.
Junction box and connection faults. Poor adhesion, bad solder joints or faulty bypass diodes can cause hot spots and, in the worst cases, burn marks.
For owners, the lesson in 2012 was that the warranty is only as good as the company behind it and the module’s actual construction. Practical safeguards included buying from manufacturers with a track record, requiring independent inspection and EL imaging of samples, specifying PID-resistant materials, and keeping flash-test data to support any claim. The same reasoning applied to public programmes in Malaysia, including off-grid and hybrid systems in rural areas, where early failures can undermine public confidence in solar for years.
Quality assurance matured after 2012. The IEA PVPS Task 13 review published in 2014 gave the industry a shared vocabulary for module failures and field-inspection methods such as thermography, EL and UV fluorescence imaging. IEC 61215 was later restructured into a multi-part standard, with test procedures in IEC 61215-2, and a dedicated technical specification, IEC TS 62804, was developed for PID testing. Long-term operations contracts also brought quality failures to light faster, as described in our restored report on the market for MW-scale PV O&M. For a broader look at durability and lifetime claims, see the truth about solar.