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PV module consolidation in 2013–2014: how the 2012 oversupply was expected to reshape manufacturing

In October 2012 the PV module industry faced roughly twice as much supply as demand. What analysts expected for 2013–2014, who had already failed, and what followed.

Line illustration for Renewable Energy

By October 2012 the solar module industry was in its second year of a deep downturn. Factories built during the 2010–2011 boom could make roughly twice as many modules as the world was installing, prices and margins had collapsed, and well-known European names had already gone into insolvency. That month GTM Research published an outlook arguing that much more consolidation was coming in 2013 and 2014, and setting out what it expected to happen. This article reconstructs that picture as it stood in late 2012, using the analyst reports and company announcements of the time.

The oversupply in numbers

The core problem was simple arithmetic. In June 2012 GTM Research’s PV Technology, Production and Cost Outlook: 2012–2016 estimated about 59 GW of module supply against roughly 30 GW of demand for 2012, which it described as close to 110% oversupply. NPD Solarbuzz, in September 2012, put full-year 2012 module demand at about 29 GW, with around 13 GW in the first half.

Bar chart: estimated 2012 PV module supply of about 59 GW against demand of about 30 GW Supply Demand ~59 GW ~30 GW Estimates for 2012, GTM Research (June 2012)
Figure: GTM Research's mid-2012 estimate of global module supply versus demand for 2012.

The consequences showed up in balance sheets. According to GTM’s October 2012 analysis, module makers’ gross margins had fallen from more than 30% in late 2010 to low single digits by mid-2012, even for the lowest-cost producers. Buyers increasingly treated modules as interchangeable commodities, which removed much of the pricing power that brand and perceived quality had once provided.

Who had already fallen by late 2012

Several of the casualties GTM pointed to were in high-cost locations:

Company What happened When
Solon (Germany) Filed for insolvency; insolvency administrator announced a takeover by UAE-based Microsol Filed 13 December 2011; deal announced 1 March 2012
Q-Cells (Germany) Filed for insolvency after loan restructuring failed; sold to South Korea’s Hanwha Filed early April 2012; deal agreed late August 2012; business handed over 19 October 2012
First Solar (US, plants in Germany and Malaysia) Announced closure of its Frankfurt (Oder) manufacturing in Q4 2012 and indefinite idling of four lines in Kulim, Malaysia, from 1 May 2012; about 2,000 positions cut, roughly 30% of its workforce Announced 17 April 2012

First Solar expected restructuring and related charges of US$245–370 million, most of it asset impairment at Frankfurt (Oder). The Q-Cells sale mattered to Malaysia as well as Germany: Hanwha’s offer covered most of the staff at Q-Cells’ German and Malaysian sites. The effect of the downturn on Malaysia’s plants is covered in more detail in our restored article on international PV manufacturers in Malaysia.

What analysts expected for 2013–2014

GTM’s October 2012 outlook listed eight trends. In summary:

  1. Most producers in high-cost regions would exit. GTM expected module facilities in high-cost locations (mainly Western Europe and the US) to fall to about 9% of global capacity by 2015, from 32% in 2009, with the survivors mostly regional assembly plants owned by companies producing mainly offshore.
  2. Thin film would shrink. It expected thin film to fall below 5% of module capacity by 2014, from 19% in 2009, with Hanergy, Solar Frontier and First Solar holding 92% of the remaining thin-film base. Crystalline silicon costs below US$0.50 per watt by 2014 were expected to close the competitive window for most thin-film firms.
  3. China’s domestic build-out would prop up selected suppliers through large project and EPC awards.
  4. Some struggling Chinese pure-play firms would receive more debt from domestic lenders, as LDK had from the city of Xinyu in 2012.
  5. Asian firms would keep buying embattled European suppliers, following the Sunways, Scheuten, Q-Cells and Solon transactions.
  6. Some Chinese pure-play firms could be absorbed by diversified or state-owned groups.
  7. Smaller Chinese “zombie” firms would eventually be allowed to consolidate, because supporting them was damaging stronger producers.
  8. Large diversified conglomerates (GTM named LG, Samsung, AU Optronics, Sharp, Panasonic, Bosch and Saint-Gobain) would have to differentiate sharply or leave.

NPD Solarbuzz reached a similar conclusion from a different angle. In September 2012 it described 2013 as a “stabilization” phase marked by growing consolidation and liquidation among lower-tier manufacturers, with underperforming Chinese tier-2 and tier-3 firms expected to exit after a period in which European and US companies had supplied most of the bankruptcies.

Why factory economics drove the shake-out

The forecasts all rest on the same unit economics: a factory survives only if its selling price per watt exceeds its full cost per watt with enough margin to service debt and fund upgrades. GTM’s June 2012 outlook projected that leading Chinese crystalline-silicon producers would reach manufacturing costs of about US$0.45/W by 2015, against average selling prices of about US$0.61/W, while mainstream module efficiency rose from 14.9% to 16.4%.

A worked example using those 2015 projections shows the margin a low-cost leader could expect:

Gross margin per watt = ASP − cost = 0.61 − 0.45 = US$0.16/W
Gross margin (%)      = 0.16 / 0.61 ≈ 26%

A producer whose costs were even US$0.10/W higher would see that margin fall to around 10%, before overheads and interest. At 2012 prices, with margins already in low single digits, small differences in scale, wafer cost or efficiency decided who could keep running. The same reasoning explains why the most expensive capacity, in Europe and the US, was expected to close first, and why quality began to suffer as producers cut corners, a problem examined in our restored article on poorly made PV modules.

What this meant at the time

For buyers, consolidation raised a practical question: would the manufacturer still exist to honour a 20- or 25-year module warranty? For producing countries such as Malaysia, it meant that plants owned by high-cost Western parents were exposed, while plants serving as low-cost bases for international groups might gain lines as others closed. GTM itself acknowledged that a key risk to its view was the possibility of anti-dumping duties on Chinese modules in Europe.

What has changed since

Much of the October 2012 outlook proved directionally right, although exact comparisons are difficult because later statistics measure production share rather than installed capacity.

  • Manufacturing moved decisively to Asia. Fraunhofer ISE’s November 2016 Photovoltaics Report put China and Taiwan at 67% of global module production in 2015, the rest of Asia-Pacific and Central Asia at 14%, Europe at 5% and the US and Canada at 3%. That is consistent with GTM’s expectation that high-cost regions would end up with a small single-digit share.
  • Thin film did shrink, though not quite as far as forecast. Fraunhofer ISE reported thin-film technologies at about 8% of annual production in 2015, with silicon wafer-based technology at about 93%.
  • Malaysia absorbed lines from Europe. In January 2015 Hanwha Q CELLS announced it would stop all cell and module manufacturing in Germany by 1 March 2015 and move the lines to its main factory in Cyberjaya, keeping research and development in Thalheim.
  • Joint ventures were unwound. In September 2016 SunPower agreed to buy AU Optronics’ stake in their Melaka cell joint venture, then described as an 800 MW facility, for US$170 million paid over four years.

The broader pattern of rising volumes and shrinking manufacturer numbers can be followed in our restored reports on the 177 GW global PV milestone for 2014 and the growth of MW-scale PV operations.

Sources and further reading

  1. PV Module Consolidation in 2013-2014: What to Expect (Shyam Mehta, 18 October 2012, archived copy), Greentech Media / GTM Research
  2. PV oversupply issues will see 60 GW capacity come offline by 2015 (27 June 2012), pv magazine
  3. PV stabilization phase predicted in 2013 (24 September 2012), pv magazine
  4. First Solar press release on restructuring, 17 April 2012 (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1), US Securities and Exchange Commission / First Solar
  5. Solon files for insolvency (14 December 2011), pv magazine
  6. Microsol will take Solon over (29 February 2012), pv magazine
  7. Hanwha wins Q-Cells bid (29 August 2012), pv magazine
  8. Q-Cells-Gläubiger stimmen dem Verkauf an Hanwha zu (30 August 2012), Solarserver
  9. Q-Cells an Hanwha übergeben (19 October 2012), pv magazine Deutschland
  10. Photovoltaics Report, updated 17 November 2016 (archived copy), Fraunhofer ISE
  11. Hanwha Q CELLS stopping production in Germany, shifting lines to Malaysia (21 January 2015), PV Tech
  12. SunPower to buy AUO's stake in cell JV (20 September 2016), pv magazine