International solar PV manufacturers in Malaysia (2012)
Who was making solar PV in Malaysia in early 2012: First Solar, Q-Cells, AUO SunPower, Panasonic, MEMC and Tokuyama, with capacities, locations and what happened next.
In October 2012 the PV module industry faced roughly twice as much supply as demand. What analysts expected for 2013–2014, who had already failed, and what followed.
By October 2012 the solar module industry was in its second year of a deep downturn. Factories built during the 2010–2011 boom could make roughly twice as many modules as the world was installing, prices and margins had collapsed, and well-known European names had already gone into insolvency. That month GTM Research published an outlook arguing that much more consolidation was coming in 2013 and 2014, and setting out what it expected to happen. This article reconstructs that picture as it stood in late 2012, using the analyst reports and company announcements of the time.
The core problem was simple arithmetic. In June 2012 GTM Research’s PV Technology, Production and Cost Outlook: 2012–2016 estimated about 59 GW of module supply against roughly 30 GW of demand for 2012, which it described as close to 110% oversupply. NPD Solarbuzz, in September 2012, put full-year 2012 module demand at about 29 GW, with around 13 GW in the first half.
The consequences showed up in balance sheets. According to GTM’s October 2012 analysis, module makers’ gross margins had fallen from more than 30% in late 2010 to low single digits by mid-2012, even for the lowest-cost producers. Buyers increasingly treated modules as interchangeable commodities, which removed much of the pricing power that brand and perceived quality had once provided.
Several of the casualties GTM pointed to were in high-cost locations:
| Company | What happened | When |
|---|---|---|
| Solon (Germany) | Filed for insolvency; insolvency administrator announced a takeover by UAE-based Microsol | Filed 13 December 2011; deal announced 1 March 2012 |
| Q-Cells (Germany) | Filed for insolvency after loan restructuring failed; sold to South Korea’s Hanwha | Filed early April 2012; deal agreed late August 2012; business handed over 19 October 2012 |
| First Solar (US, plants in Germany and Malaysia) | Announced closure of its Frankfurt (Oder) manufacturing in Q4 2012 and indefinite idling of four lines in Kulim, Malaysia, from 1 May 2012; about 2,000 positions cut, roughly 30% of its workforce | Announced 17 April 2012 |
First Solar expected restructuring and related charges of US$245–370 million, most of it asset impairment at Frankfurt (Oder). The Q-Cells sale mattered to Malaysia as well as Germany: Hanwha’s offer covered most of the staff at Q-Cells’ German and Malaysian sites. The effect of the downturn on Malaysia’s plants is covered in more detail in our restored article on international PV manufacturers in Malaysia.
GTM’s October 2012 outlook listed eight trends. In summary:
NPD Solarbuzz reached a similar conclusion from a different angle. In September 2012 it described 2013 as a “stabilization” phase marked by growing consolidation and liquidation among lower-tier manufacturers, with underperforming Chinese tier-2 and tier-3 firms expected to exit after a period in which European and US companies had supplied most of the bankruptcies.
The forecasts all rest on the same unit economics: a factory survives only if its selling price per watt exceeds its full cost per watt with enough margin to service debt and fund upgrades. GTM’s June 2012 outlook projected that leading Chinese crystalline-silicon producers would reach manufacturing costs of about US$0.45/W by 2015, against average selling prices of about US$0.61/W, while mainstream module efficiency rose from 14.9% to 16.4%.
A worked example using those 2015 projections shows the margin a low-cost leader could expect:
Gross margin per watt = ASP − cost = 0.61 − 0.45 = US$0.16/W
Gross margin (%) = 0.16 / 0.61 ≈ 26%
A producer whose costs were even US$0.10/W higher would see that margin fall to around 10%, before overheads and interest. At 2012 prices, with margins already in low single digits, small differences in scale, wafer cost or efficiency decided who could keep running. The same reasoning explains why the most expensive capacity, in Europe and the US, was expected to close first, and why quality began to suffer as producers cut corners, a problem examined in our restored article on poorly made PV modules.
For buyers, consolidation raised a practical question: would the manufacturer still exist to honour a 20- or 25-year module warranty? For producing countries such as Malaysia, it meant that plants owned by high-cost Western parents were exposed, while plants serving as low-cost bases for international groups might gain lines as others closed. GTM itself acknowledged that a key risk to its view was the possibility of anti-dumping duties on Chinese modules in Europe.
Much of the October 2012 outlook proved directionally right, although exact comparisons are difficult because later statistics measure production share rather than installed capacity.
The broader pattern of rising volumes and shrinking manufacturer numbers can be followed in our restored reports on the 177 GW global PV milestone for 2014 and the growth of MW-scale PV operations.